Treasury Management Update

Quarter Ended 31st December 2020

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The CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) Code of Practice for Treasury Management recommends that members be updated on treasury management activities regularly (annual, mid-year or quarterly reports). This report, therefore, ensures this Council is implementing best practice in accordance with the Code.

1. Economics update

- **UK.** The key quarterly meeting of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5.11.20. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5.11.20 to 2.12.20 which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that "announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target". Its forecasts appeared, at that time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
    - The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
    - The Bank also expected there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
    - CPI inflation was therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the "inflation risks were judged to be balanced".
- Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it "stands ready to adjust monetary policy", the MPC this time said that it will take "whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit". The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank's willingness to embrace new tools.
- One key addition to **the Bank's forward guidance in August** was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase, (or decrease), through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years as it will take some years to eliminate spare capacity in the economy, and therefore for inflationary pressures to rise to cause the MPC concern. **Inflation** is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.
- **COVID-19 vaccines.** We had been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID-19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9th November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, this vaccine has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70c that impairs the speed of application to the general population. It has therefore been particularly welcome that the Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine has now also been approved which is much cheaper and only requires fridge temperatures for storage. The Government has 60m doses on order and is aiming to vaccinate at a rate of 2m people per week starting in January, though this rate is currently restricted by a bottleneck on vaccine production; (a new UK production facility is due to be completed in June).
- These announcements, plus expected further announcements that other vaccines could be approved soon, have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second**

half of 2021, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels; this would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could start to be eased, beginning possibly in Q2 2021 once vulnerable people and front-line workers have been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% in 2021 instead of 9%.

- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. It is likely that the one month national lockdown that started on 5th November, will have caused a further contraction of 8% m/m in November so the economy may have then been 14% below its pre-crisis level.
- **December 2020 / January 2021**. Since then, there has been rapid back-tracking on easing restrictions due to the spread of a new mutation of the virus, and severe restrictions were imposed across all four nations. These restrictions were changed on 5.1.21 to national lockdowns of various initial lengths in each of the four nations, as the NHS was under extreme pressure. It is now likely that wide swathes of the UK will remain under these new restrictions for some months; this means that the near-term outlook for the economy is grim. However, the distribution of vaccines and the expected consequent removal of COVID-19 restrictions, should allow GDP to rebound rapidly in the second half of 2021 so that the economy could climb back to its pre-pandemic peak as soon as late in 2022. Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that in the second half of this decade, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The significant caveat is if another mutation of COVID-19 appears that defeats the current batch of vaccines. However, now that science and technology have caught up with understanding this virus, new vaccines ought to be able to be developed more quickly to counter such a development and vaccine production facilities are being ramped up around the world.
- **Brexit.** The final agreement on 24.12.20 has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. As the forecasts in this report were based on an assumption of a Brexit agreement being reached, there is no need to amend these forecasts.
- **Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 17th December.** All nine Committee members voted to keep interest rates on hold at +0.10% and the Quantitative Easing (QE) target at £895bn. The MPC commented that the successful rollout of vaccines had reduced the downsides risks but they were still sufficiently concerned that they voted to extend the availability of the Term Funding Scheme, (cheap borrowing), with additional incentives for small and medium size enterprises for another six months from 30.4.21 until 31.10.21. (The MPC had assumed that a Brexit deal would be agreed.)
- **US.** The Democrats won the presidential election in November, and now that they have won two Senate seats in Georgia in early January, they have effective control of both Congress and the Senate, although power is more limited in the latter. This is likely to enable the Democrats to provide more fiscal stimulus to the economy and so help the speed of economic recovery.
- **The economy** had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a fourth wave - impacting widely across the US this time. This

latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.

- The restrictions imposed to control the spread of the virus are once again weighing on the economy with employment growth slowing sharply in November and retail sales dropping back. The economy is set for further weakness in December and into the spring. However, a $900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December will limit the downside. GDP growth is expected to rebound markedly from the second quarter of 2021 onwards as vaccines are rolled out on a widespread basis and restrictions are loosened.
- After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal.
- The Fed's meeting on **16 December** tweaked the guidance for its monthly asset quantitative easing purchases with the new language implying those purchases could continue for longer than previously believed. Nevertheless, with officials still projecting that inflation will only get back to 2.0% in 2023, the vast majority expect the fed funds rate to be still at near-zero until 2024 or later. Furthermore, officials think the balance of risks surrounding that median inflation forecast are firmly skewed to the downside. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields low – **which will also have an influence on gilt yields in this country.**
- **EU.** In early December, the figures for **Q3 GDP** confirmed that the economy staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns. This provides grounds for optimism about growth prospects for next year. In Q2, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by "only" 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth is likely to stagnate during **Q4 and in Q1 of 2021**, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries: it is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism.
- With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore **unlikely to be a euro crisis** while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US,

the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.

- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth.
- **Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone.
- **World growth.** World growth will have been in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

2. Interest rate forecasts

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Following the conclusion of the HM Treasury review of PWLB margins over gilt yields on 25.11.20, all forecasts below now include the 1% reduction in the non-HRA Certainty Rate (now gilt yields plus 80bps):

Link Group Interest Rate View 9.11.20													
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20													
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, the Governor of the Bank of England has made it clear that he currently thinks that such a move would do more damage than good and that more quantitative easing is the favoured tool if further action becomes necessary. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected within the forecast horizon ending on 31st March 2024 as economic recovery is expected to be only gradual.

GILT YIELDS / PWLB RATES. There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was heightened expectations that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020. In addition, there were growing expectations of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued. Combined, these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers. This means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer

spending, inflation, etc. The consequence of this has been **the gradual lowering of the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets.** Over the year prior to the coronavirus crisis, this has seen many bond yields up to 10 years turn negative in the Eurozone. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession.

Gilt yields had, therefore, already been on a generally falling trend up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies during March. After gilt yields initially spiked upwards in March, we have seen yields fall sharply in response to major western central banks taking rapid policy action to deal with excessive stress in financial markets during March, and starting massive quantitative easing driven purchases of government bonds: these actions also acted to put downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds. Such unprecedented levels of issuance in "normal" times would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. **At the close on 31st December, all gilt yields from 1 to 8 years were in negative territory, while even 25 year yields were only at 0.84% and the 50 year at 0.64%.**

From the local authority borrowing perspective, HM Treasury imposed **two changes of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates in 2019-20** without any prior warning. The first took place on 9.10.19, adding an additional 1% margin over gilts to all PWLB period rates. That increase was then, at least partially, reversed for some forms of borrowing on 11.3.20, but not for mainstream non-HRA capital schemes. A consultation was then held with local authorities and **on 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates;** the standard and certainty margins were reduced by 1% but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three year capital programme. The new margins over gilt yields are as follows: -.

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
- **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
- **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates, (gilts plus 80bps), above shows, there is likely to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next three years as it will take the UK a prolonged period to eliminate spare capacity in the economy so that inflation might start to become a sufficient concern for both the MPC to consider raising Bank Rate, and for gilt holders to require a higher yield.

3. Annual Investment Strategy

The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2020/21, which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, was approved by the Council on 6th February 2020. In accordance with the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice, it sets out the Council's investment priorities as being:

- Security of capital
- Liquidity
- Yield

The Council will aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity and with the Council's risk appetite. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short-term to cover cash flow needs, but also to seek out value available in periods up to 24 months.

As shown by the interest rate forecasts in section 2, it is now impossible to earn the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as all short term money market investment rates are barely above zero now that Bank Rate is at 0.10%, while some entities, including more recently the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF), are offering negative rates of return in some shorter time periods. Given this environment and the fact that increases in Bank Rate are unlikely to occur before the end of the current forecast horizon of 31st March 2024, investment returns are expected to remain low.

Negative investment rates
While the Bank of England has said that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, (at least in the next 6 - 12 months), some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in investment balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short-term until those sums were able to be passed on. Meanwhile, uncertainty among corporate investors has also heightened their preference for the very short end of the yield curve. This, combined with a glut of monies which was particularly acute in the run up to the calendar year end, lead to some financial entities offering yet deeper negative yields or simply closing their books to new monies until 2021 began.

As for money market funds (MMFs), yields drifted lower through to the close of the calendar year. In response, managers continued to trim fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remained in positive territory through the final quarter of the year.

Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to elevated cash levels seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur, or when further large receipts will be received from the Government. In addition, the impact of the change in the PWLB margin has had a marked impact on rates being offered.

Creditworthiness.
Although the credit rating agencies changed their Outlook on many financial institutions from Stable to Negative during the quarter ended 30.6.20, the majority of ratings were affirmed due to the continuing strong credit profiles and wider government support provided to financial markets and economies in general. During Q1 and Q2 2020, banks did make provisions for *expected* credit losses, while the most recent set of quarterly reports saw a number of entities revise down provisions in light of better economic outlooks. As we move into the next quarters ahead, more information will emerge on *actual* levels of credit losses. (Quarterly performance is normally announced in the second half of the month following the end of the quarter.) This has the potential to cause rating agencies to revisit their initial rating adjustments if they are found to be misaligned. These adjustments could be negative or positive, although it should also be borne in mind that UK banks, among others, went into this pandemic with strong balance sheets.

Investment Counterparty criteria
The current investment counterparty criteria selection approved in the TMSS is meeting the requirement of the treasury management function.

CDS prices
Although CDS prices (these are market indicators of credit risk) for banks (including those from the UK) spiked upwards at the end of March / early April as the crisis unfolded, they have returned to near pre-pandemic levels

by the close of the year. **However, sentiment can easily shift, so it remains important to undertake continual monitoring of all aspects of risk and return in the current circumstances.**

Investment balances

The average level of funds available for investment purposes during the quarter was **£49m**. These funds were available on a temporary basis, and the level of funds available was mainly dependent on the timing of precept payments, receipt of grants and progress on the capital programme. The Council holds **£20.5m** core cash balances for investment purposes (i.e. funds available for more than one year). The investment portfolio yield for the first nine months of the year was 0.48%. This is the weighted average rate of interest earned on investments held by the Council between 1 April and 31 December. The 0.54% average interest rate shown in the table below is the weighted average rate of interest on outstanding investments on 31 December.

	Amount £	Average Interest Rate %
Managed By NHDC		
Banks	9,500,000	0.06
Building Societies	9,000,000	0.14
Local Authorities	18,000,000	0.36
Money Market Fund	3,000,000	0.09
Government	6,000,000	**-0.01**
NHDC Total	**45,500,000**	**0.27**
Managed by Tradition		
Building Societies	4,500,000	1.30
Tradition Total	**4,500,000**	**1.30**
TOTAL	**50,000,000**	**0.54**

In percentage terms, this equates to:

	Percentage
Money Market Fund	6
Government	12
Banks	19
Building Societies	27
Local Authorities	36

The approved 20/21 strategy is that no more than 60% of investments should be placed with Building Societies with a maximum value of £16M. The value at 31 December was £13.5M. This limit was breached in October by £2.0M for nineteen days. Addition checks have been put in place to ensure this does not happen again.

The pie chart below shows the spread of investment balances as at 31 December 2020. This is a snapshot in time that demonstrates the diversification of investments.



The chart below shows the Council's investment maturity profile. This does not include the £3.0M held in the Public Sector Deposit Fund Money Market account nor the £1.0M held in a Notice Accounts.



The Council's Original budgeted investment return for 2020/21 was £0.300M. The projection was amended at the 1st quarter to £0.185M and based on current investments and cashflow forecasts this remains unchanged and it is expected that the Council will generate £0.185M of interest.

The graph below shows the average rate of interest on outstanding investments at 31 December.



The higher rates achieved through Tradition reflect that these are longer-term investments and that these investments were generally made pre Covid-19. In general, the Council can currently achieve similar rates for the same length of investment. The Council only undertakes new investments through Tradition where the rate achieved (after fees) are greater than what the Council could achieve for a similar investment.

4. Borrowing

No long term borrowing was undertaken during the quarter ended 31 December 2020.

Based on 3rd quarter estimates for capital expenditure, the Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2020/21 is expected to be -£5.002M (-£5.595M at the end of 19/20). The CFR denotes the Council's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances (internal borrowing). . The balance of external and internal borrowing is generally driven by market conditions and future forecasts.

Loans Outstanding at 31 December 2020:

	Amount	Average Interest Rate
	£	%
Public Works Loans Board	£414k	9.89

Estimated outstanding debt:

Year	Forecast Borrowing £m	Forecast other long-term liabilities £m	Forecast Total External Debt £m	Operational Boundary £m	Authorised Limit £m
31st March 2020	0.423	2.125	2.548	3.7	9
31st March 2021 (Forecast)	0.405	1.622	2.027	3.2	9
31st March 2022 (Forecast)	5.635	1.119	6.754	7.9	12
31st March 2023 (Forecast)	5.353	0.616	5.969	7.1	11
31st March 2024 (Forecast)	6.450	0.113	6.563	7.4	12
31st March 2025 (Forecast)	12.726	0	12.726	13.6	18

* Comprises the finance lease relating to Letchworth Multi-storey car park and impact of the finance lease for waste vehicles.

The external borrowing forecast can be used to give an indication of the borrowing that may be required, which is combined with outstanding existing borrowing. The Council will also borrow for short-term cash-flow needs if

required. The actual borrowing that is taken out will depend on the latest forecasts and the offers that are available at the time that it is required. There will also be a consideration of when any other borrowing becomes due, with the aim of achieving a spread of these dates. This is to try and avoid refinancing risk. The Council is required to set indicators for the maturity structure of its borrowing. Given the low level of borrowing that the Council currently has and is forecast to have, it is considered appropriate to maintain full flexibility as to the exact duration of any borrowing undertaken.

To manage refinancing risk, the Council sets limits on the maturity structure of its borrowing. However, these indicators are set relatively high to provide sufficient flexibility to respond to opportunities to repay or take out new debt (if it was required), while remaining within the parameters set by the indicators. Due to the low level of existing borrowing, the under 12 months limits have a broad range to allow for cash-flow borrowing (if it was required).

Maturity Period	Lower %	Upper %
Under 12 months	0	100
12 months to 2 years	0	50
2 years to 5 years	0	60
5 years to 10 years	0	70
10 years to 20 years	0	80
20 years and above	0	100

The Council may have a need to borrow next year if the Capital Programme is fully spent so may need to apply a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).

The Prudential Indicator below considers the cost of borrowing as a % of the net revenue budget of the Council.

Year	Estimated cost of borrowing £m	Forecast net revenue budget £m	Estimated cost of borrowing as a % of net revenue budget
2020/21	0.041	20.245	0.20
2021/22	0.275	18.441	1.49
2022/23	0.274	15.519	1.77
2023/24	0.334	15.487	2.16
2024/25	0.597	15.481	3.86

The Council is required to set a prudential indicator that estimates financing costs (cost of borrowing less income from investments) as a percentage of its net revenue budget.

Year	Estimated cost of borrowing £m	Less: Forecast of interest earned £m	Net Financing Costs £m	Forecast net revenue budget £m	Estimated cost of borrowing as a % of net revenue budget
2020/21	0.041	0.185	-0.144	20.245	-0.711
2021/22	0.040	0.103	-0.063	18.441	-0.342
2022/23	0.275	0.102	0.173	15.519	1.115
2023/24	0.274	0.097	0.177	15.487	1.143
2024/25	0.334	0.096	0.238	15.481	1.537

5. Debt Rescheduling

No debt rescheduling was undertaken during the quarter.

6. Compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits

It is a statutory duty for the Council to determine and keep under review the affordable borrowing limits. During the quarter ended / year to date as at 31st December 2020, the Council has operated within the treasury and prudential indicators set out in the Council's Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2020 except for nineteen days in October. The limit on investments placed with Building Societies was exceeded by £2.0 million. Measures have been put in place to ensure limits are not exceeded again.

APPENDIX 1: Prudential and Treasury Indicators for 2020-21 as at 31st December 2020

Treasury Indicators	2020/21 Budget £'000	31.12.20 Actual £'000
Authorised limit for external debt	12,000	414
Operational boundary for external debt	6,900	414
Gross external debt	5,807	414
Investments	26,000	50,000
Net borrowing	-20,193	-49,586
Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing - upper and lower limits		
Under 12 months	18	18
12 months to 2 years	18	18
2 years to 5 years	61	61
5 years to 10 years	69	69
10 years to 20 years	7	7
20 years to 30 years	250	250
Upper limit for principal sums invested over 365 days	11,000 Max	0

Prudential Indicators	2020/21 Budget £'000	31.12.20 Actual £'000
Capital expenditure *	2,354	1,203
Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) *	-5,002	-5,226
In year borrowing requirement	5.4	0
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream *	2.10	-2.99